Page 68 - Juvenile Practice is not Child's Play

Appendix A. Landmark Supreme Court Decisions

Kent v. United States

In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966), Morris Kent, at the age of 16 and while on

probation for previous offenses, was arrested for rape and robbery. The juvenile court waived its jurisdiction and
transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. In so doing, the juvenile court held no
hearing and did not rule on the Kent’s counsel’s motions for a waiver hearing and for access to Kent’s juvenile social

service file, which was compiled by juvenile court officials during Kent’s probation. After a trial in the district court,
Kent was acquitted by reason of insanity of the rape charge, but convicted on six counts of housebreaking and robbery.
He was sentenced to a total of 30 to 90 years in prison. Kent appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Kent appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed and

remanded to the district court to determine, after a de novo hearing on waiver, whether waiver was inappropriate.
Interpreting the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act "in the context of constitutional principles relating to due
process and the assistance of counsel," 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the waiver of juvenile

court jurisdiction was a "critically important" action that entitled youth to a hearing with the assistance of counsel,
access to records, and a statement of the reasons for the juvenile court’s decision.

In re Gault

In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), Gerald Gault ("the child") was 15 years old and on
probation when he was taken into custody after a female neighbor complained of lewd phone calls. After a hearing
before the juvenile court, the child was ordered committed into the State Industrial School until he attained the age of

21. The child’s parents filed a writ of habeas corpus in the state courts, challenging, on due process grounds, the
constitutionality of Arizona’s Juvenile Code and the procedure actually used in their child’s case. The Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for the writ. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the

juvenile court adjudication of "delinquency" must comply with due process requirements. The Court held that the child
and their parents or guardian must be given notice of the delinquency hearing, with specific allegations against the child
set out, enough in advance of the hearing to prepare. Also, it held that the child and parents/guardians must be advised
of their right to be represented by counsel and that, if they cannot afford counsel, that counsel would be appointed to

represent the child. The Court also held that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies in such
proceedings and that, absent a valid confession, a juvenile in such proceedings must be afforded their constitutional
rights of confrontation and sworn testimony of witnesses available for cross examination.