Page 69 - Juvenile Practice is not Child's Play
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In re Winship


            In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), a New York Family Court judge relied on a
            preponderance of the evidence, the standard of proof required by the New York Family Court Act, in finding that the

            child, a 12-year-old boy, had committed a crime that would be considered a larceny if adjudicated in adult court. The
            New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme
            Court held that youths, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when they are

            charged with violation of a criminal law.


            Fare v. Michael C.


            In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1979), Michael C. ("the child") was 16 years old and
            on probation when he was implicated in a murder. He was advised of his Miranda rights and asked if his probation
            officer could be present during the interrogation, but the police refused. He then agreed to talk to the police without an
            attorney and subsequently incriminated himself in the murder. The probation department then moved to make the

            child a ward of the state based on his incriminating statements. The child moved to suppress the statements but the trial
            court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that statements had been made in violation
            of the child’s Fifth 43 Amendment right against self-incrimination. Specifically, the California Supreme Court held that

            the child’s request for his probation officer constituted a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in the same
            way that a request for an attorney was found to be. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the child’s
            request for his probation officer was not a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment Miranda rights. The Court went
            on to hold that "whether the statements obtained during subsequent interrogation of a juvenile who has asked to see his

            probation officer, but who has not asked to consult an attorney or expressly asserted his right to remain silent, are
            admissible on the basis of waiver remains a question to be resolved on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
            interrogation."  442  U.S.  707,728  (1979).  The  court  went  on  to  conclude  that,  based  on  the  records  before  it,  the

            statements obtained by the police were proper and their admission was correct.
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