Page 72 - Juvenile Practice is not Child's Play

IV.

Custody
F.L. was in custody when a uniformed School Resource Officer, the school principal, and a teacher stopped

him in the gym, demanded that he empty his pockets and then instructed him to remain on the bleachers. See in the
Matter of D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (where officers asserted their authority of
Respondent and confronted Respondent with incriminating evidence establishing probable cause to arrest, encounter
escalated to custodial.). For purposes of Miranda, “[t]he [Supreme] Court agreed that ‘the circumstances of each case

must certainly influence’ the custody determination, but reemphasized that ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether
there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.’”
Yarbororough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam)).

Custody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive his
circumstances. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).

While the custody analysis does not take into account the subjective mental state of the suspect to prevent officers

from having to analyze a suspect’s idiosyncrasies, age is different. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403. It is not an idiosyncrasy,
but a fact with common sense implications. Id. As the Supreme Court recognized in J.D.B., custodial interrogation is

inherently coercive and can induce false confessions, especially when the subject is a juvenile. Children like F.L. are
less mature and less responsible than adults; lack experience, perspective and judgment to recognize and avoid poor
choices; and are vulnerable or susceptible to outside pressures. Id. As long as age is known or objectively apparent to
the officer, it is appropriate consideration in determining whether a suspect was in custody at the time of

interrogation. Id. at 2406.

In this case, there was no question that F.L. was a child according to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 51.01(b). The School

Resource Officer and the principal clearly recognized him as a student. In addition, the circumstances of F.L. seizure
by the uniformed School Resource Officer, who was employed by the ____ Police Department, clearly involved a
restraint on freedom of movement associated with a formal arrest. As articulated in Yarborough. According to the
information provided by the government, the School Resource Officer seized F.L. in the school gym, conducted a

search of his person and directly questioned him about the events concerning the underlying charges in the case. See
Dunaway v. New York, 442, U.S. 200, 215 (1979). Further, the officer instructed F.L. to sit on the bleachers while the
officer stood directly in front of him. F.L. did not feel free to leave the school gym prior to or during questioning by

the officer and was therefore in custody

Even where the circumstances of custody do not constitute an arrest under Fourth Amendment analysis, those
circumstances may nonetheless indicate “custody” for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Texas Court of Criminal

appeals made clear that the “mere fact that an interrogation begins as non-custodial does not prevent custody from
arising later. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Even if Jonathan was not formally placed