Page 84 - Juvenile Practice is not Child's Play

experience with law enforcement and separation from his parents all undermine any assertion that F.L. executed a

waiver of his rights. See Halely, 332 U.S. at 599.

XVIII.

Invoked Right to Counsel During Interrogation

The officer’s interrogation of F.L. at the detention center two weeks after his arrest was obtained in violation

of F.L.’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel. All police questioning must cease when a suspect unambiguously invokes
his right to counsel. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). The police are not required to clarify a suspect’s
ambiguous request for an attorney and may continue questioning. Id. at 549-60. However, when an individual makes

a clear invocation of his right to counsel, any statement obtained thereafter must be suppressed as a violation of the
Miranda doctrine. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

F.L. unambiguously invoked his right to counsel while at the police station on the day of his arrest when he stated to

the officer, “I want to talk to my dad and lawyer before I give a statement.” This is a clear and explicit invocation of his
right to counsel, requiring that the officer stop all questioning. See Nunez v. State, 07-08-0475-CR, 2010 WL 2891760,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 26, 2010, pet. ref'd). Notwithstanding this clear assertion of his rights, the officer

resumed his interrogation when he visited F.L. two weeks later with F.L.’s probation officer. “[W]hen an accused has
invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The police, or any government agent, may not question the suspect

any further until counsel has been made available to him. Id. the Edwards decision presumes the involuntariness of any
statement made by a suspect during custodial interrogation following the suspect’s request for counsel. Maryland v.

Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (2010) (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 690 (1988)). Any subsequent statements
made in response to interrogation, without an attorney present, violates the suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153 (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043 (1983)).

The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ends when there is a break in custody. Whether or not there was a break
in custody depends on if the suspect regained a “sense of control or normalcy” after he was first taken into custody for
the charges of which he is accused. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1221 (citing Minnick, 498 U.S. at 148-49). The coercive effects

associated with custodial interrogation are dispelled when a suspect is released from pre-trial custody and allowed to
return to his normal life for a significant period of time before a second interrogation. See id. at 1222-23 (finding 14
days sufficient to dissipate coercive effects of prior custody and holding that police may re-interrogate a suspect after
a 14-day break, even if suspect invoked his Miranda right to counsel during the former custodial interrogation). In

Shatzer, the Court held that release back into the general prison population for the conviction of an unrelated crime is