Page 80 - Juvenile Practice is not Child's Play

XIV.

Involuntary / Coerced Statement

Statements made to police that are not the “product of free will and rational choice” must be suppressed.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978). F.L. has a constitutional right to a fair hearing on this matter, at which the

government bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of the statements by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego
v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 (1964). The test used by courts to determine
voluntariness is whether the defendant’s free will has been overborne, given the totality of the circumstances. Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991). The issue of free will must be addressed in light of the facts of the specific

case. Coercive interrogation techniques as applied to, or independent of, the unique characteristics of the suspect
must also be taken into consideration. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1985) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 432-434 (1986)).

Statements or admissions involving juveniles require special attention when evaluating voluntariness. In re Gault, 387
U.S. at 45. The Supreme Court has recognized that youth and inexperience make juveniles more vulnerable to

interrogation techniques and that their confessions must be examined with “special care.” Haley, 332 U.S. at 599
(refusal to allow 15-year-old’s mother access to him and absence of counsel contributed to the involuntariness of his
confession); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 45 (Juvenile’s confession requires “special caution” because of the increased
susceptibility of youth to coercion due to “fantasy, fright or despair”). Juvenile confessions must not be “the product of

. . . fright or despair.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55. The determination of voluntariness for juveniles involves the review
of additional evidence such as the (1) The child’s age, intelligence, maturity, and experience; (2) the amount of time in
the custody of the police; (3) the amount of time isolated from family and friendly adult advice; (4) whether the child

was asked if they wanted to assert their rights; (5) whether the child was informed of their rights in their language;
and (6) whether there was unnecessary delay in taking the child before a magistrate.

F.L. was interrogated on four separate occasions in this case: (1) after he was stopped in the school gym; (2) inside the

principal’s office; (3) while at the police station; and (4) while detained at the juvenile detention center. In each
instance, Jonathan was away from home and away from his parents when questioned at different times by a
uniformed school officer, a uniformed police officer, a detective and a probation officer about the underlying charges.
His request to speak with his parents was promptly and repeatedly denied, and he was questioned without their

presence. At school, F.L. was frightened and intimidated by not only the officer, but also the principal and teacher
who were initially present during the first interrogation. F.L. was subjected to intense questioning for an extended
time without any food or drink, and no breaks.