Page 85 - Juvenile Practice is not Child's Play

equivalent to being returned to “normal life” and does not create the coercive, custodial pressures identified in

Miranda. Id. at 1221. Here F.L. was not in custody on an unrelated charge, but was held solely in connection with the
alleged offense about which he was interrogated. F.L. was never released from pre-trial custody in this case and was
not allowed to return to his normal life or regain any sense of control or normalcy to dispel the coercive nature of

custody as defined by Miranda. Because the detective directly asked F.L. questions about the underlying charges in
this case while F.L. was still in custody at the detention facility and had previously invoked his right to counsel, any
statements elicited by the deterctive while interviewing F.L. at the detention facility must be suppressed in violation
of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda.

XIX.
th
6 Amendment violation
The Sixth Amendment requires that police cease all questioning after a defendant has been indicted. Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964) (citing) Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)). Confessions deliberately
elicited by a government agent after formal indictment must be suppressed as a violation of the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel. Id. The Constitution guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel after indictment –
anything less would deny the defendant “effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and
advice would help him.”Id. (quoting Spano, 360 U.S. at 326). Therefore, any direct or “secret interrogation” of the

defendant after indictment, without the presence of counsel, is a violation of the defendant’s fundamental rights. Id. at
205.

F.L. was arraigned and appointed counsel for the drug charges in this case. F.L. was then ordered to remain at the
detention center, pending his trial date. As stated above, a detective and probation officer came to the detention
facility to question F.L., post-arraignment. The detective told F.L. that he was there to talk about a separate offense,

unrelated to the drug charges in this case. However, the detective quickly changed the interview and directly asked
F.L. questions about the drug charges for which he had already been arraigned. The detective and probation officer
deliberately elicited incriminating statements from F.L. about the underlying charges in this case, without the
presence of counsel. While the detective initiated the interview, giving the impression that he was there for a different
purpose, it is clear that he violated F.L.’s fundamental right to counsel when he directly questioned F.L. about the

charges in this case. Therefore, any statements made by F.L. to the detective and probation officer at the detention
facility must be suppressed as a violation of F.L.’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.