Page 74 - Juvenile Practice is not Child's Play

the principal’s office and continued to maintain custody over F.L. while directing him into the principal’s office,

shutting the door behind them, and holding him there for questioning. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 215. The principal’s
office was small, measurinNo more than 13 by 13 feet, and was crowded with a desk, two chairs, the principal, two
uniformed officers and F.L.’s girlfriend. F.L. was ushered into the office ahead of the resource officer, did not feel free

to leave, and was therefore in custody prior to further interrogation.

VII.
Interrogation “reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response”

F.L. was interrogated inside the principal’s office prior to being warned of his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Custodial interrogation has been defined by the Supreme Court as “. . .
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. However, interrogation does not only apply to police practices that

involve direct questioning of a defendant while in custody. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 298. Interrogation under Miranda also
refers to “words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301. This behavior is the functional equivalent of police interrogation

within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 302.

Here, the officer knew or should have known that the interaction with F.L.’s girlfriend would elicit statements from
F.L. In F.L.’s presence, the officer asked his girlfriend about the underlying charges in this case, fully aware that her

response would likely elicit statements from F.L. Thereafter, the officer continued to question F.L. directly about the
allegations after excusing his girlfriend from the office. Under the circumstances, the officer’s interaction with F.L.’s
girlfriend constituted interrogation of F.L. for the purposes of Miranda.

VIII.
Did not knowingly intelligently, and voluntarily waive Miranda.

F.L. did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before he was subject to
custodial interrogation inside the principal’s office. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. Statements made during custodial

interrogation must be suppressed unless the prosecution can demonstrate that Miranda warnings were given prior to
questioning. Innis, 446 U.S. 291. Unless the government can show that the client was given and understood the
warning, the Court must presume that there was no valid waiver.