Page 77 - Juvenile Practice is not Child's Play
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The Supreme Court held that “Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either

            express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Here, the officer directly questioned F.L. about
            the school incident after his arrest. Any questions even remotely related to the subject of his arrest are an
            interrogation for Miranda purposes. Because the officer questioned F.L. after he was already under arrest, this

            constituted custodial interrogation.

                                                             XI.

                           Did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive rights (Mirandized)

                   While F.L. was clearly advised of his rights at the police station, F.L. did not knowingly, intelligently and

            voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before he was subject to custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. The
            question of whether the waiver is valid depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Butler, 441 U.S. at 374-75
            (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (waiver factors included the facts and circumstances of the case such
            as the background, experience and conduct of the defendant). It is also appropriate for a court to consider the

            intellectual capacity and education of the accused. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967) (juvenile’s confession
            requires “special caution” because of the increased susceptibility of youth to coercion due to “fantasy, fright or
            despair”).  Factors to consider include the juvenile’s age, experience with law enforcement, education, background and

            intelligence, circumstances surrounding the statement itself, and whether the juvenile has the ability to comprehend
            his Miranda rights. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); E.A.W. v. State, 547 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. App.—
            Waco 1977), no writ.


            Under the totality of the circumstances, F.L. could not have executed a valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights
            before the investigator engaged in custodial interrogation. His young age, combined with his lack of experience with
            law enforcement, suggests that he did not have adequate prior knowledge of Miranda warnings before this case.  F.L.

            was 15 years old at the time of his arrest. An armed and uniformed officer placed F.L. in handcuffs after more than an
            hour of questioning at school, transported him to the police station and then placed him in an interrogation room
            after denying his numerous requests to speak with his parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §52.025(c) (“A child may not
            be left unattended in a juvenile processing office and is entitled to be accompanied by the child’s parent, guardian, or

            the child’s attorney”); Cf. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1962) (the absence of an adult or counsel are critical
            factors in determining whether a minor’s statement is involuntary); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (refusal to

            allow 15-year-old’s mother access to him and absence of counsel contributed to the involuntariness of his confession).

            Once at the police station, the officer insisted on speaking with F.L. at length. The questioning was extensive. Under
            these circumstances, F.L. would not have been able to waive his rights in any meaningful sense. These circumstances
            were exacerbated by F.L.’s low intellectual functioning. Although the officer claims to have advised F.L. of his rights,

            he acknowledges that he never asked if F.L. could read, and he never asked F.L. to read the card out loud. Cf. Carter v.
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