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The Supreme Court held that “Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either
express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Here, the officer directly questioned F.L. about
the school incident after his arrest. Any questions even remotely related to the subject of his arrest are an
interrogation for Miranda purposes. Because the officer questioned F.L. after he was already under arrest, this
constituted custodial interrogation.
XI.
Did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive rights (Mirandized)
While F.L. was clearly advised of his rights at the police station, F.L. did not knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before he was subject to custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. The
question of whether the waiver is valid depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Butler, 441 U.S. at 374-75
(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (waiver factors included the facts and circumstances of the case such
as the background, experience and conduct of the defendant). It is also appropriate for a court to consider the
intellectual capacity and education of the accused. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967) (juvenile’s confession
requires “special caution” because of the increased susceptibility of youth to coercion due to “fantasy, fright or
despair”). Factors to consider include the juvenile’s age, experience with law enforcement, education, background and
intelligence, circumstances surrounding the statement itself, and whether the juvenile has the ability to comprehend
his Miranda rights. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); E.A.W. v. State, 547 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1977), no writ.
Under the totality of the circumstances, F.L. could not have executed a valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights
before the investigator engaged in custodial interrogation. His young age, combined with his lack of experience with
law enforcement, suggests that he did not have adequate prior knowledge of Miranda warnings before this case. F.L.
was 15 years old at the time of his arrest. An armed and uniformed officer placed F.L. in handcuffs after more than an
hour of questioning at school, transported him to the police station and then placed him in an interrogation room
after denying his numerous requests to speak with his parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §52.025(c) (“A child may not
be left unattended in a juvenile processing office and is entitled to be accompanied by the child’s parent, guardian, or
the child’s attorney”); Cf. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1962) (the absence of an adult or counsel are critical
factors in determining whether a minor’s statement is involuntary); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (refusal to
allow 15-year-old’s mother access to him and absence of counsel contributed to the involuntariness of his confession).
Once at the police station, the officer insisted on speaking with F.L. at length. The questioning was extensive. Under
these circumstances, F.L. would not have been able to waive his rights in any meaningful sense. These circumstances
were exacerbated by F.L.’s low intellectual functioning. Although the officer claims to have advised F.L. of his rights,
he acknowledges that he never asked if F.L. could read, and he never asked F.L. to read the card out loud. Cf. Carter v.